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The following essay, which discusses the trade and environment jurisprudence of the
World Trade Organization and its implications for the Japan-U.S. whaling dispute, is
excerpted from "Multilateralism, Unilateralism, and Bilateralism in U.S.-Japan Trade
Relations: A WTO Law Perspective," a paper the author delivered at the conference on
Japan-U.S. trade relations, held at Keijo University, Tokyo, last spring. A complete copy
of the paper, which discusses two additional WTO cases, one involving the European
Union challenge to Section 301 of the U.S. trade legislation, and the other involving the
Canada-US. Auto Pact, is available from the author or from Law Quadrangle Notes.
In Turtles, a case arising in the late
1990s, the WTO Appellate Body (AB)
considered an appeal from a panel that
found a U.S. embargo of shrimp fished
with turtle-unfriendly technology a
violation of Art. XI of the GATT, and not
justifiable under Art. XX. Much along the
lines of the earlier Tuna/Dolphin panels, the
panel in Turtles basically excluded from the
possibility of Art. XX justification unilateral
trade measures targeting environmental
practices or policies in other countries as
per se inconsistent with the spirit or
character of the multilateral trading system.
(In this case, unlike the Tuna/Dolphin cases,
the panel had relied in a very loose and
imprecise way on the language in the
preambular paragraph of Art. XX, or
"chapeau" about "unjustified and arbitrary
discrimination.")
Upon appeal, the AB took a very
different approach. It viewed unilateral
trade measures targeting other countries'
policies as in principle capable of
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justification under the particular heads of
Art. XX (in this case, exhaustible natural
resources) and made t'he strong statement
that: "It is not necessary to assume that
requiring from exporting countries
compliance with, or adopting certain
policies (although covered in principle by
one or another of the exceptions)
prescribed by the importing country,
renders a measure a priori incapable of
justification under Article XX." However, in
examining whether the U.S. embargo was
in relation to the conservation of
exhaustible natural resources, the AB body
raised, without answering it, the question
of whether some kind of territorial nexus
between the country taking the measures
and the resources being conserved was
necessary to satisfy the requirement that
the measures be "in relation to exhaustible
natural resources." The AB considered that
it was not necessary to answer this
question, because even if such a nexus
were required, it would be satisfied in this
case, apparently by virtue of the fact that
some of the endangered species of sea
turtles migrated through U.S. territorial
waters. But what if none of the turtles
swam through U.S. territorial waters 7
Would the AB have viewed the "commons"
nature of the endangered species, as
reflected in relevant international
agreements, as a sufficient nexus with U.S.
interests, again assuming one is actually
required' It is possible that the AB body
was divided on whether a nexus was
required, and what kind of nexus it might
be. Perhaps the AB, or some of them, were
groping towards something equivalent to
the "effects" doctrine in international
antitrust.
Having found the U.S. embargo to be
justified under Art. XX(g), the AB went on
to consider whether the United States had
met the requirement under the "chapeau"
of Art. XX that the measure not be applied
"in a manner that would constitute
arbitrary or unjustified discrimination
between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade." Here,
the AB found several elements of arbitrary
or unjustified discrimination in the
application of the scheme: the U.S. had

engaged in serious negotiations with some
countries to deal with its conservation
concerns but had not made comparable
efforts with the complainants in this case;
although the statute provided flexibility as
to what equivalent technologies employed
by other countries' shrimpers could satisfy
the requirement of turtle-friendliness,
when the scheme was applied, all shrimp
not caught with the U.S.-prescribed TED
technology were embargoed; and customs
decisions on which shrimp could be
imported, and which not, under the
scheme were apparently arbitrary and nontransparent. The AB strongly implied that
the straightforward extraterritorial
application of domestic environmental
regulation, indifferent to divergent
conditions that prevail in different
countries, would be unlikely to satisfy the
requirements of the "chapeau." It suggested
that the detailed application of embargoes
of this nature would be judged against the
expectation (found within certain
international environmental agreements
themselves, e.g., the Rio Declaration) that a
state would not normally resort to
unilateral action of this kind without
having first seriously attempted to enter
into negotiations with the other state(s)
concerned, in order to find a way of
achieving the environmental objectives in
question in a manner consistent with the
different conditions prevailing in the other
state(s) .
While being faithful to the entire text of
Art. XX, which does not per se exclude
such unilateralism, the AB arguably struck
a balance that is beneficial to the
enhancement of multilateral or plurilateral
cooperation to solve environmental
commons problems. On the one hand, a
state that contemplates unilateralism
cannot go forward with it - as an
automatic reflex, as it were - without
being prepared to make a significant
investment in the attempt to achieve a
cooperative solution, which includes
addressing different conditions in the other
countries that may make them justifiably
reluctant to adopt U.S. environmental
standards. On the other hand, a state or
states that refuse to enter into serious
negotiations and frustrate cooperative

solutions to environmental commons
problems will not be protected against
unilateralism by WTO law. In sum, the
effect of the balance struck in Turtles is to
create significant incentives for all sides
caught in a trade and environment dispute
to negotiate.
♦♦♦

The Turtles ruling has significant
implications for the current dispute
between the United States and Japan with
respect to whaling. Whales are an
endangered species, protected under a
multilateral environmental agreement to
which both the United States and Japan are
signatories, The International Convention
for the Regulation of Whaling. Under the
Convention, the International Whaling
Commission (IWC) may impose
restrictions on whaling to safeguard whales
as an exhaustible natural resource. Such
decisions are to be taken by supermajority
vote. Pursuant to these procedures, the
Commission has enacted a moratorium on
whaling. However, Art. V:3 of the
Convention allows individual signatories to
lodge objections to decisions of this kind
by the IWC, within a specified time frame,
with the result that the decision in question
is not binding on that signatory. Thus,
Norway has engaged in commercial
whaling subsequent to the moratorium,
pursuant to an objection that it filed within
the required time period. While Japan did
not file such an objection, it has for some
time vigorously opposed the moratorium,
arguing that there is scientific evidence that
a complete ban on commercial whaling is
no longer necessary to protect the viability
of the species. Japans manner of protesting
the moratorium has been to engage in
killings of whales for purposes of scientific
research, which is permitted under an
exception to the Whaling Convention.
Under the practice of the Commission, this
exception is interpreted narrowly; its
guidelines in effect create a least restrictive
means test, asking whether the research
result could be achieved by non-lethal

means, and also whether the sought
research results are actually required for
legitimate scientific purposes. When Japan's
proposal for much expanded scientific
research-based killings of whales was
examined in the Scientific Committee of
the IWC, the opinion of scientists was
deeply divided as to whether the proposed
activity would meet the guidelines for
application of the exception, and the
Committee was unable to endorse the
Japanese proposal as consistent with the
exception in Art. VIII of the Convention.
Accordingly, the IWC promulgated a
resolution stating that "gathering
information on interactions between
whales and prey species is not a critically
important issue which justifies the killing
of whales for research purposes" and that
"information on stock structure, which
may be relevant to management, be
obtained using non-lethal means."
Therefore, the Japanese government was
urged to refrain from issuing the permits
proposed under its program.
Japan, however, refused to comply with
the resolution and proceeded to issue
permits for the whaling in question After
expressing U.S. concern through subtler
measures of diplomatic pressure, President
Clinton, finally, in the fall, announced one
sanction against Japan - a prohibition on
Japanese fishing in certain U.S. waters and the administration is currently
considering trade sanctions pursuant to the
Pelly Amendment. The Japanese
government has made suggestions that it
could commence a WTO action in the
event that trade sanctions are imposed.
How would such a dispute be resolved
under WTO law as interpreted in the
Turtles case? There would be obviously no
difficulty in characterizing the whales as
exhaustible natural resources within the
meaning of Art. XX(g). What, however, of
the requirement that there be a rational
relationship or connection between such
sanctions and the protection of whales as
an exhaustible natural resource? In the
Turtles case, the AB found that such a
rational relationship could exist where the
trade measures were designed to "influence
countries to adopt national regulatory
programs" that would serve the protection
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of the endangered species. However, it also
seemed important to the AB that the U.S.
measure was designed (although not
applied) in such a manner as to permit
entry into the United States of shrimp that
were caught in a turtle-friendly manner,
rather than being a prohibition on all
shrimp from jurisdictions that catch shrimp
in a turtle-unfriendly manner. From an
obsetvation along these lines, the AB
concluded that "it appears to us that
Section 609, cum implementing guidelines,
is not disproportionately wide in its scope
and reach in relation to the policy objective
of protection and consetvation of sea
turtles ." Now here the AB does not
actually say what would have been
disproportionately wide in scope and
reach. Given that the AB actually accepts
that measures that operate through suasion
of other governments in their policies have
a rational relationship to the objective in
question, it could not come to the
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conclusion that a ban on all shrimp would
necessarily be "disproportionately wide" in
scope and reach, if such a ban could
reasonably be viewed as appropriate to the
kind of suasion at issue. Trade in whale
meat and by-products is already banned by
virtue of the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species (CITES).
Thus, the statement of the AB in Turtles
leaves us wondering what additional
measures would be disproportionately wide
in scope and reach. What about import
restrictions on Japanese automobiles? Or
television sets? In the Reformulated Gasoline
case, the AB severely criticized the panel
below for interpreting the language
"relating to" in Art. XX(g) in such a way as
to assimilate the .kind of fit required
between a measure and objective in the
case where the treaty language used the
word "necessary" to the kind of fit required
in the case of Art. XX(g). So we know from
Reformulated Gasoline that the AB cannot
have in mind here a test as strict as that of
least-restrictive-means.
My sense is that what the AB is saying
here is that the trade restricting scheme
must be rationally coherent in light of the
objective it purports to serve. Such rational
coherence might be undermined, for
example, if the scheme sanctioned Japan
not only for killing whales but also other
species not endangered or not protected as
such under international law. Such
coherence could also be undermined if the
choice of imports to which the sanctions
apply were chosen in such a way, not to
maximize appropriate commercial pressure
on Japan, but to maximize protective rents
to domestic American producers for whom
the products in question represent fierce
import competition. Another example
might be a case where the scheme provides
for the sanctions to continue, say, for six
months after the offending conduct has
been discontinued. Such an extension
could be regarded as punitive or
protectionist or both, but not as welltailored to the goal of inducing the other
state to engage in the desired
conservationist behavior.

Thus, the recommendations of the
commerce secretary to the president
should take into account the AB's concerns
that measures under XX(g) not be
disproportionately wide in scope and
reach, by designing a scheme that avoids
features not well-tailored or closely
connected to the goal of stopping the
offending whaling, or which would seem to
allow other purposes or goals (protection
of domestic industries) to intrude into and
disrupt the means-ends coherence of the
overall scheme. Discussion so far appears
to revolve around restricting imports of
Japanese fish products into the United
States. To the extent that the dispute
revolves around Japan's fisheries practices,
and more importantly to the extent that
these are not products that are in
competition with domestic U.S.
production, this seems a sensible approach.
To the extent that products that are in
competition with domestic U.S. production
cannot be avoided for the sanctions to have
the needed impact, the import restrictions
could be balanced by export restrictions,
say of pollock and salmon. Thus, any
protective benefit to U.S. producers in the
fisheries sector could be balanced by an at
least equivalent burden to those producers
(and the export restrictions would put
further pressure on Japan, because these
are products favored by Japanese
consumers).
A different challenge posed by this
dispute for WTO law is that Japan may
possibly argue that the U.S. measures are
not rationally related to conservation of
exhaustible natural resources, because the
Japanese practice at which they are targeted
does not impair the conservation of those
resources. Here, Japan would present the
scientific evidence that it claims to be able
to muster that certain whale populations
have increased to the point where takings
are not endangering. Could one really say
that the "scientific" killings, even on the
scale now engaged in by Japan, make a real
difference as to whether the species are
endangered or not?
But it only takes a moment's reflection
on the "tragedy of the commons" to
appreciate the speciousness of such a
potential line of argument. The tragedy of
the commons does not occur because an

individual user, unconstrained, depletes the
commons to the point of exhaustion indeed an individual user might well have
enough incentives in tenns of future
availability of the commons resource to
itself, not to deplete to that extent. The
tragedy occurs because the unconstrained,
or uncoordinated exploitation of the
commons by multiple users has the
combined effect of exhausting the
commons resource.
The real issue, therefore, is the relation
of the conduct being sanctioned to the
collective management of the commons
resource in question with a view to
avoidance of a tragedy of the commons.
Refusing to abide by a resolution of the
IWC that suggests its conduct falls outside
of what is permitted under the multilateral
regime for the management of whales as a
global commons resource, Japan has
effectively defected from a cooperative
approach to the management of this
commons resource. Where defections go
unsanctioned, such regimes of multilateral
cooperation may well unravel. In
sanctioning such defection, the U.S.
measures would be rationally related to
preserving a multilateral regime for the
conservation of whales.
The application of the U.S. measures
would also have to be consistent with the
"chapeau" of Art. XX. Here, it should be
recalled that in the Turtles case, the AB
found "unjustified discrimination" within
the meaning of the "chapeau" because the
U.S. scheme was applied differently to the
complainants than to some other countries.
One source of consternation in Japan about
the possibility of United States trade
sanctions is that the United States has not
sanctioned Norway, which actually has an
active commercial whaling industry, having
reserved against the obligation to
implement the IWC moratorium, as noted
above. Despite its reservation, the IWC has
also promulgated a resolution urging
Norway to stop whaling. Is, then, the
application of trade sanctions pursuant to
the Pelly Amendment against Japan but not
Norway "unjustified discrimination" within
the meaning of the "chapeau"? I do not
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believe so. The meaning of "unjustified"
must be read in light of the Rio Convention
objective of advancing multilateral,
cooperative solutions to environmental
commons problems, noted by the AB in
Turtles. However objectionable Norway's
behavior may be from the perspective of
conservationist values and policies, Norway
is not "cheating" or defecting from the
relevant multilateral regime . Japan is using
a "loophole" in the Convention that the
IWC has determined that it is not entitled
to use under the circumstances, and is thus
threatening the coherence and integrity of
that regime . Norway is operating under an
objection or reservation to the IWC
decision on a moratorium, which it is
legally entitled .to, under the terms of the
treaty itself I believe the United States is
justified in taking into account this
difference in the character of the two
countries' behavior from the perspective of
sustaining the legal and institutional
framework for cooperative management of
the exhaustible resource in question.
It is true that Japan questions, not
without some justification, the premise of
the current approach of the multilateral
regime , i.e., whether a ban is any longer
necessary for preservation of the species in
question. The IWC itself, since 1994, has
been developing an alternative approach,
based upon catch limits set in light of best
available information on the situation with
regard to individual species. However,
there are considerable uncertainties in
estimates of whale populations. Therefore,
in the absence of solving issues with
respect to the reliability of data, it is
understandable that the IWC has yet to
implement this alternative approach; this
could be said to reflect the precautionary
principle, which the AB, in Honnones,
viewed as an established principle of
international environmental law, albeit not
of international law more generally.
In any case, the bargaining costs of
obtaining agreement among a range of state
actors with divergent interests on specific
catch limits could be sufficiently high that
a moratorium might remain the most
efficient rule, even if, in a world where
bargaining costs were zero, the optimal
conservation rule would rather consist of
more specific limits on takings.
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